Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Remapping Revisionism: Japan’s Nuclear Ambiguity 「修正主義の再創造: 原子力への曖昧さ」

by Yuki Natsui
(originally published May 2016)
(republished May 2016 on Dianuke.org)
Maritime Self-Defense Force ships gather for a fleet review near Sagami Bay | Koichi Kamoshida

This essay provides an overview of the historical attempts to revise the Constitution of Japan (promulgated in November 1946) and the issues that have been present in the resurgent anti-war movement to counter the loosening of constitutional restraints on the abuse of power. It also provides a discussion of the driving forces behind constitutional revision as situated in relation to the regional balance of power maintained under an American politico-military aegis. It is argued that the formations underpinning constitutional revision, legitimized by successive regimes of government, preclude efforts to advance dialogue on the risks and externalities posed by the preservation and maintenance of the country’s plutonium economy and security apparatus.

On Article 9 and the Cold War

Restraints placed on militarism by Article 9, which renounces war as a ‘sovereign right’ and outlaws the ‘use of force’ as a means of settling international disputes,[1] have served as a constitutional and legal bulwark against decisions to permit greater Japanese involvement in the international collective security system. Yet proposals to lift these restraints have often been received in the narrow sense of the possibility that Japanese soldiers might someday be deployed alongside its allies to participate in overseas military adventures. Revisionism cannot be viewed in isolation as an instance of postwar phenomena, but rather must be understood carefully in relation to the contemporary situation of the Cold War. It is an appropriate term insofar as it conveys the tension between power blocs over competing claims on spheres of influence, accompanied by military strategies in which direct ‘hot’ conflicts involving nuclear arsenals are less preferable to indirect ‘cold’ conflicts restricted to conventional forms of warfare. It is more constructive to frame regional complexities in the Asia-Pacific as a continuation of existing historical trends,[2] with consideration given to how the distribution and utilization of nuclear technologies have instated nuclear weapons as political instruments for projecting military and economic power across the globe.
「国権」の発動たる戦争と国際紛争を解決する手段としての「武力の行使」を放棄するという憲法9条による軍事力の制限は[1]、国際的な集団安全保障システムへの日本のより大きな関与を認めようという論議から、憲法・法律的な防波堤となってきた。これまで、この制限を撤廃しようとする提案は、しばしば、日本の自衛隊員が同盟国に巻き込まれる形で、その軍事的冒険に参加するべく派遣されるのではないかという狭義の話として受け取られてきた。修正主義は、戦後事象の一例としてのみとらえるべきではなく、むしろ、現代の冷戦状況の文脈において注意深く理解されるべきものである。「冷戦」とは、地球上において対立する主張を持つ勢力圏間の緊張を表す限りにおいては適切な用語である。 すなわち、核兵器を含む直接的な「熱戦」は、伝統的な意味での戦争に限定される「冷たい」紛争より好ましくない。アジア太平洋地域の複雑性を、核兵器を、地球上における軍事的・経済的な力を投影する政治的なツールとして位置づけ、原子力技術をいかに分配し利用するかを、継続する歴史的な傾向として構成する[2]ことの方がより建設的である。

Politics of constitutional revisionism

In concurrence with progressive reforms to dismantle Japan’s imperial military complex and restructure its civil and industrial institutions, the new government formulated and promulgated the Constitution of Japan under the directive of General Douglas MacArthur and his staff. Though initially met with opposition from conservative voices, it has never been amended since its enactment in May 1947. Constitutional revision had been sidelined as a political issue throughout the 1960s and 1980s, a period characterized by tremendous social unrest—notably the ANPO struggle, as well as the protests of 1968 and the emergence of the New Left—and, on the other end, by impressive economic growth and rise in urban consumerism. By the 1990s, following the end of the Gulf Wars, commitments to a doctrine of unarmed neutrality had largely been displaced by campaigns for constitutional revision in response to pressures to fulfill international norms of multilateral peacekeeping. In 1994, the Yomiuri Shimbun published its set of suggestions for amendment, reigniting a polarizing debate that has since guided public discourse. While leftists, progressives and pacifists sought to maintain the existing Constitution, conservatives, populists and nationalists advocated for provisions that would expand Japan’s contribution to international society. Changes in public opinion on Article 9 also occurred alongside nuclear confrontations between the United States and North Korea, as well as the country’s unilateral claims to preemptive self-defense with regard to the launching of the Taepodong-1 over Japanese territory.[3]

Since its formation in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has maintained constitutional revision as its key policy platform, although attempts over the decades to carry out amendment had faltered due to popular resistance. In April 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party proposed a new eleven-chapter draft amendment comprising one hundred ten articles, with a desire to “unshackle the country from the system established during the Occupation and make Japan a truly sovereign state.”[4] In recent years, the LDP led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has displayed a stronger commitment to constitutional revision, placing it as a top administrative priority. Alongside a series of provisions that could have a considerable impact on the universality of natural rights, the ruling coalition has set forth proposals to replace the existing Self-Defense Forces with a National Defense Military.[5] This new section uses the term ‘軍’, connoting an established army or military. These proposed changes are significant because the scope of SDF operations has traditionally been restricted to exercising ‘individual self-defense’, as well as providing auxiliary support to UN-mandated peacekeeping missions following the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992.[6] The NDM represents a complete transformation of the SDF into a permanent military institution with the Prime Minister as its supreme commander.
1955年の結党以来、自由民主党は、一貫して憲法改正を党綱領に掲げてきたが、改正の試みは国民の抵抗により行き詰ってきた。2012年4月、「占領時代に確立されたシステムから脱却、日本を真の主権国家にする」[4]という望みを持って、自由民主党は11章110条からなる憲法改正案を提案した。近年、安倍晋三首相に率いられた自民党は、憲法改正にさらに強くコミットしており、政権の最優先課題のひとつと位置付けている。自然権の普遍性に対して少なからぬ影響を与えるかもしれない一連の条文に加えて、連立与党は現在の自衛隊を国防軍に置き換えようと提案している。[5] この新しい条文は、常設のarmyまたはmilitaryを含意する「軍」という用語を使っている。この変更案は重大である。何故ならば、自衛隊の作戦行動の範囲は伝統的に個別自衛権の範囲に、1992年の国際平和維持協力法の施行以来、国連軍の平和維持活動への支援の範囲に、制限されてきたからだ。[6] 国防軍は、内閣総理大臣を最高司令官とし、自衛隊を常設の軍隊に完全に改組するものである。

It should be recalled that America’s ‘reverse course’ policies toward Japan relied on steady rearmament and politico-economic stabilization in response to the growing perception of a Communist threat in the region. Upon the eruption of the Korean War in the early 1950s, the National Police Reserve was introduced as measure to reinforce domestic security. With the support and urging of the United States, the NPR was reorganized as the National Safety Forces in 1952, and was subsequently renamed the Self-Defense Forces in 1954.[7] Proposals outlined in the draft amendment would appear to indicate this regress in the focus of SDF operations. The new provisions enable the government to restrict and subordinate individual rights and freedoms (of assembly and of association) to the ‘public interest and public order’, rather than protect them under the ‘public welfare’. Concerns loom over the prospect that the NDM may also be assigned for internal security tasks such as law enforcement, police surveillance and counterinsurgency efforts.[8] The blueprint also includes a section granting the Prime Minister the authority to declare a ‘state of emergency’ under prevailing conditions, in which the Cabinet can enact orders having an effect tantamount to that of laws passed by a Diet resolution.[9]
これは、地域における共産主義の知覚の広がりに対応するための、着実な再軍備化と政治社会的な安定化に基づく米国の「反転」政策を思い起こさせる。1950年代の朝鮮戦争の勃発に伴い、国内の安全保障のために警察予備隊が設置された。米国の支持と要請により、警察予備隊は1952年に保安隊に改組され、1954年に自衛隊と改称された。[7] 改正案に示される提案は、自衛隊の行動におけるこの逆行を表すものだ。この新条文は、政府が、よりも「公共の利益と公共の秩序」のために、個人の権利と(集会および結社の)自由を、「公共の福祉」のもとでそれらを保護するのではなく、制限し従属させることを可能にする。国防軍は 法の強制、警察の監視や内乱の鎮圧等の国際安全保障任務に就かされるのではないかとの懸念もある。[8] 青写真には、内閣総理大臣に「非常事態」を宣言する権限を与える条項を含んでいる。非常事態が宣言された場合、議会が承認した法律と同様の効果をもたらす指令を出すことができる。[9]

Trends in domestic and foreign policy

These constitutional amendments should be considered together with the reactionary trends of historical revisionism, educational reform and media manipulation observed under the LDP-dominated political system. In December 2006, a complete revision of the Fundamental Law of Education was formulated and passed in order to nurture compatriotism and stronger regard for traditional family values.[10] The language used throughout the text would seem to elevate the state over the individual,[11] displaying tendencies normally confined to wartime regimes of government. Diet groups such as the Nippon Kaigi organization have also been committed to popularizing conservative values such as ‘moral education’, centrality of the imperial family and respect for the national flag and the national anthem, principles inherent in the draft amendment.[12]
これらの憲法改正の動きは、自民党主導の政治システムにおける、歴史修正主義や教育改革、報道修正といった反動的な傾向と併せて検討されなければならない。2006年12月、愛国主義の涵養と伝統的な家族観への回帰を目的とした教育基本法の抜本改正が審議可決された。[10] 条文の根底に流れるのは、個人よりも国家を上位に置き[11]、通常であれば戦時下においてのみ政府に与えられる傾向を示すものである。日本会議国会議員懇談会のような議会グループは、改正案の固有の原則として、「道徳教育」、皇族中心主義、国旗および国歌への尊敬等の保守的価値観の普及に強くコミットしてきた。[12]

In December 2014, the Specifically Designated Secrets Protection Law was enacted, allowing the government to designate by fiat any information related to national defense, diplomacy, anti-terrorism and anti-espionage as state secrets.[13] Its vagueness of scope and lack of oversight has been criticized on the grounds that it threatens criminal prosecution of bureaucrats who might leak designated secrets and the journalists who might report them.[14] Incentives for the passage of the SDS law, which in effect created the framework to enable the mutual exchange of classified information with the United States through the National Security Council,[15] are manifold. Geopolitical motives involve Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia and China over the ownership of the Southern Kuril islands and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Other considerations include the political aftermath of the disaster unfolding at Fukushima Daiichi, as well as potential uprisings in response to defaulting on sovereign debt obligations and collapsing of public pension funds,[16] scenarios that can easily disrupt the ‘public interest and public order’.
2014年12月、特定機密の保護に関する法律が施行され、政府は、国家安全保障、外交、対テロリズム、国家機密に関するスパイ防止に関するあらゆる情報を、専断により指定できるようになった。[13] その範囲の曖昧さと監督の欠如は、指定された機密をリークした官僚およびそれを報道したジャーナリストを刑事訴追される恐れがあるとして批判されている。[14] 特定機密法は、国家安全保障会議を通じて米国と指定情報を交換することを可能とする枠組みを組成するものであり[15]、その成立の誘因は多様である。地政学的な動機は、南千島列島や釣魚島/尖閣諸島を巡るロシア、中国との領土紛争問題である。他に考慮すべき事項としては、福島第一原子力発電所の次々と明らかになる悲劇の政治的影響、財政赤字や公的年金基金の破綻への高まる危機対応の可能性[16]、「公共の利益と公共の秩序」が容易く破壊されるシナリオ等がある。

In March 2016, the Peace Security Law was enacted, enabling the SDF to exercise the right to ‘collective self-defense’,[17] or the use of military force to defend another state from an armed attack, marking another expansion of the U.S.-Japan security partnership. In the Diet deliberations of August 2015, lawmaker Taro Yamamoto presented the contents of the third Armitage-Nye report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank known to be heavily funded by the Japanese government and nuclear industry companies.[18] The contents of the national security legislation were found to be identical to the suggestions in the report, some of which have included the restart of nuclear power plants, participation in Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, repeal of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and protection of national secrets under the U.S.-Japan security treaty.[19]
2016年3月、平和安全法制が施行され、自衛隊が「集団的自衛権」[17]を行使しできる、すなわち、軍事的攻撃に対して他国を防衛するために軍事力を行使できるようになった。これにより、米日安全保障パートナーシップに更なる拡大をもたらした。2015年8月の国会審議において、山本太郎参議院議員は、ワシントンDCにあるシンクタンクで、日本政府および原子力関連企業が多くの基金を提供していることで知られる戦略国際問題研究所(CSIS)が発行した第3次アーミテージ=ナイ報告の内容を示した。[18] 安全保障法の内容は、原発再稼働、TPP交渉への参加、武器輸出三原則の修正、普天間基地の移設および日米安全保障条約にもとづく国家機密の保護など、この報告書で示唆されているものとそっくりであることが判明した。[19]

In line with these deliberations, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani specified that under the security bills, the Self-Defense Forces would be allowed to transport, repair and store nuclear weapons for foreign or multinational forces.[20] More recently, the Abe Cabinet has issued statements on two separate accounts explaining that nuclear weapons are actually permitted under the Constitution, on the basis of an interpretation that Article 9 does not ban the country from possessing armed forces that are “the minimum necessary for self-defense.”[21] History shows how successive administrations of the Liberal Democratic Party have suggested that Japan should consider developing its own nuclear weapons program. On this topic, Australian historian Gavan McCormack chronicles Japan’s supposed ‘non-nuclear’ status:
国会審議において、中谷巌・防衛大臣は、安全法制のもと、自衛隊は外国軍もしくは多国籍軍のために核兵器の輸送、修理修繕を行うことができると明らかにした。[20] さらに最近では、安倍内閣は2つの声明を出し、9条では「最低限の防衛の必要性」を満たす戦力の保持を禁じていないことを根拠に、核兵器は現在の憲法で認められていることを説明した。[21] 歴史が示すところによれば、歴代の自由民主党政権は、自前の核兵器の保有を検討してきた。この点について、オーストラリアの歴史学者、ギャバン・マコーマックは、日本のいわゆる「非核」の状況を、次のように記している:
“Prime Minister Kishi, in 1957, is known to have favoured nuclear weapons. In 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda told US Secretary of State Dean Rusk that there were proponents of nuclear weapons in his cabinet; and his successor, Sato Eisaku, told Ambassador Reischauer in December 1964 (two months after the first Chinese nuclear test) that ‘it stands to reason that, if others have nuclear weapons, we should have them too’. US anxiety led to the specific agreement the following year on Japan’s inclusion within the US ‘umbrella’. Prime Ministers Ohira (in 1979) and Nakasone (in 1984) both subsequently stated that acquiring nuclear weapons would not be prohibited by Japan’s Peace constitution—provided they were used for defence, not offence. In the late 1990s, and with North Korea clearly in mind, the chief of the Defence Agency, Norota Hosei, announced that in certain circumstances Japan enjoyed the right of ‘pre-emptive attack’. The Defence Agency’s parliamentary vice minister, Nishimura Shingo, then carried this line of argument even further by putting the case for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons.”[22] 
The cornerstone of Japan’s ‘exclusively defense-oriented policy’ is unequivocally American nuclear warheads. The nuclear basis for the bilateral security arrangement has been outlined by the Ministry of Defense in the National Defense Program Guidelines[23] and The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,[24] each of which reaffirm Japan’s commitments to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of non-possession, non-production and non-introduction of nuclear weapons; and its continued reliance on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

The coherence to the notion that Japan can exist as a ‘non-nuclear’ state entitled to enrichment and reprocessing activities is supported by its nuclear victim status, its compliance to the three conditions of non-proliferation, disarmament and ‘peaceful’ use of nuclear technology prescribed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and its special relationship with the United States. While non-signatory states such as India, Israel and Pakistan are given preferential treatment that further legitimizes their nuclear power status, other nuclear states such as Iran and North Korea are routinely denounced for their insistence on the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy without discrimination. Japan stands to benefit from its passiveness in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament; and its simultaneous openness in exporting civilian nuclear technologies to developing countries.[25]

Government officials seem unconcerned with the presence of U.S. military bases, including the storage of American nuclear warheads in Okinawa and on American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with free access to Japanese ports, a legacy that can be traced back to the reversion agreement reached between then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon.[26] Nor would they appear to have any qualms about Japan’s bid for nuclear superpower status as it pursues the elusive goal of closing the nuclear fuel cycle via fast breeder reactors such as Monju, together with the use of plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in conventional light-water reactors. As the domestic stockpile containing forty-eight tons of weapons-usable plutonium accumulates at the Rokkasho reprocessing facility, slated for commercial operation in 2018,[27] heightened regional tensions and widened rifts between Japan and its neighbors can be expected.
日本政府の役人は、米軍基地の存在および沖縄に核弾頭を保管していること、さらに、佐藤栄作首相とリチャード・ニクソン大統領の(沖縄)返還合意に遡る遺産である核爆弾を持つ飛行機の日本の空港への自由な立ち寄りについて、無頓着であるように見える。[26] さらに彼らは、高速増殖炉もんじゅにより核燃料サイクルを完成させ、日本で標準的な軽水炉でプルトニウム・ウラニウム混合酸化物燃料を使用することにより、核大国の地位を得ようとすることについて、なんの衒いも持っていないように見える。六ケ所再生処理工場に蓄積された46トンに上る核兵器に転用可能なプルトニウムを含む国内備蓄を、2018年に商用利用しようと計画しているが[27]、このことは、地域的緊張を高め、日本と近隣諸国との亀裂を広げる恐れがある。

Because the foundation of its defense guidelines rests on American nuclear warheads, Japan has been unaffected by diplomatic efforts being made to establish a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ).[28] Constitutional revision could therefore be seen as another step forward to integrate nuclear command and control operations with America’s containment policies, particularly in relation to China and North Korea; but it could also be seen as an extension of Japan’s ‘coping strategy’ that focuses on minimizing risks when responding to a shifting international order.[29] Former U.S. negotiator Morton H. Halperin explores this complexity in detail:
米国の核弾頭にその防衛ガイドラインの基礎を置いているため、日本は、「北東アジア非核兵器地帯」(NEA-NWFZ)の成立の政治的努力に影響されてこなかった。[28] 憲法改正は、従って、米国の、特に中国と北朝鮮に関する封じ込め政策とともに、統合的な核の指揮統制作戦に歩を進めることにつながる可能性がある。一方で、国際秩序への移行に対応する際に、リスクを最小化しようとする日本の「対処戦略」を拡大するかも知れない。[29] 元米国交渉官であるモートン・ハルペリンは、この複雑性を次のように詳述している:
“Throughout the postwar period, Japanese leaders have quietly debated the question of whether Japan should develop an independent nuclear capability while some Japanese have doubted the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, most Japanese who leaned toward advocating a Japanese nuclear capability took this position because they believed such a capability would permit Japan to end the security relation with the United States and to assert an independent role in the world Japan saw no choice but to sign onto the NPT and later to accept making it permanent, while quietly maintaining its options so that it could respond if the international and domestic situation made it possible for Japan to acquire a nuclear capability.”[30]
Although the closed, plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle has failed to deliver the nation’s energy ‘needs’, it would appear to have conferred Japan the status of a de facto nuclear-weapon state. Positioned at the center of the nation’s energy and security matrix, Japan’s plutonium program has widely been regarded by public officials as a “tacit nuclear deterrent” with diplomatic functions.[31] It is unclear whether Japan intends to use its plutonium stockpiles for manufacturing its own nuclear weapons, but there should be no misunderstanding of the intentions that underlie its compliance to the non-proliferation regime.
閉じたプルトニウム核燃料サイクルが日本にとって必要なエネルギーを供給することができなくとも、それにより日本が「事実上の」核保有国としてのステイタスを授与してきた。エネルギーと安全保障のマトリクスの中心に位置づけられてきた日本のプルトニウム計画は、公務員にとっては外交機能とともに「暗黙の核抑止力」と、広くみなされてきた。[31] 日本が本当にプルトニウム備蓄を使って核兵器を開発する意図があるかどうかは定かではないが、核不拡散体制を遵守する背景にはそうした意図があることは間違いがない。

Organizing for social change

Following the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster that devastated northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, civil society witnessed a resurgence of social movements that presented another opportunity to not only reconsider nuclear power as a source of energy and reflect on the global contamination from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, but to also revisit the premises of the U.S.-Japan military partnership that is predicated on both. The incident revealed not only the administrative dysfunctions spanning local and central levels of governance; it also unveiled the bureaucratic machinations and the transnational regimes involved in influencing public opinion and policy decisions.[32]

Members of post-3/11 Japanese society certainly have expressed a stronger desire for the abolition of nuclear weapons, the phase-out of nuclear power and the transition toward renewable energy within a framework of accountability and sustainability; but there is still good reason to delineate how social progress in Japan has been hampered by tendencies toward prefigurative modes of action that eschew engagement with existing power structures.[33]

In the wake of the triple disaster, private individuals turned to social media, which offered alternatives for information otherwise unavailable. It served as a platform for planning and mobilization, helping to normalize dissident practices and negotiate commonalities of interest. But over time, social media underwent a transformation from a cultural apparatus for informative opinion into the modus operandi for collective action. David Slater provides an account for this “double-edged sword of social media” observed in post-3/11 Japan:
三重の災害の発生の最中、個人は、他の媒体では提供不可能な情報を提供するものとしてのソーシャル・メディアに目を向けた。ソーシャル・メディアは計画と動員のプラットフォームとなり、反体制派の活動を正常化し、共通の利益の交渉の助けとなった。しかし時がたつにつれて、ソーシャル・メディアは参考となる意見を提供する文化的ツールから、集団行動の手口(modus operandi)へと変容を遂げた。デビッド・スレイターは、3.11後の日本を観察し、この「ソーシャル・メディアの諸刃の剣」について説明を加えた:
“The dissipation of organized movements and even more ad hoc political participation are linked to the nature of social media… Social media offered unaffiliated and non-institutionalized individuals and groups the possibility to mobilize and work together, even to create a common cause, bypassing much of the painstaking organizational work characteristic of traditional social movements. The framing of participation as self-consciously diverse and open might have broken down institutional boundaries that once kept non-affiliated out, but the problem remains: how to keep these same supporters connected, committed and active over an extended period of time.”[34]『組織的な運動が焼失し、アドホックの政治参加が増加したことは、ソーシャル・メディアの特性によるものだ。ソーシャル・メディアは、伝統的な社会運動には付き物である骨が折れる組織化運動のほとんどを回避することで、無党派で組織化されていない個人やグループが、結集し協働し、さらには共通の目的(大義)を持つことを可能にする。多様でオープンな参加者の構成は、部外者を阻害する組織的な結合を破壊するが、課題は残っている。すなわち、同じ支持者を、長期にわたり繋げ、コミットを取り付け、活動を継続させるかである。』[34]
In contrast to their classical counterparts that are vertically integrated, social media movements are structured by horizontal networks that cannot be arbitrated. Decisions are typically made through consensus and commitments that bind people to the movement are relatively loose. While this prefigurative politics provides flexibility and mobility, the absence of centralized authority and administrative hierarchy create difficulties in reaching agreements on direction and tactics to be pursued.[35] Accordingly, the lack of professional management and strategic calculus pose serious challenges to the development of leadership and stewardship needed to organize fragmented social bases into an alternative hegemony with the power to steer political outcomes.[36]
垂直的に結合している古典的なカウンターパート(伝統的なメディア)と対照的に、ソーシャル・メディア活動はお互いに調停されない水平的なネットワークにより構成されている。意思決定は典型的にコンセンサスにより為され、人々をその運動につながらせているコミットメントは比較的弱い。この若者志向型社会の政策は柔軟性と流動性をもたらす一方、中央の権力や管理階層の欠如は、目指すべき方向性や戦術に関する合意に達することを困難にしている。[35] 従って、専門的マネジメントと戦術的計算の欠如は、バラバラの社会的背景を、政治的な成果を上げる力とともに代替的なヘゲモニーに変えるリーダーシップとスチュワードシップの育成を困難にしている。[36]

By the same measure, it remains to be seen whether a framework for social and political vision that truly confronts entrenched norms and practices will be adopted in the current peace movement. There have been no demands for a redistribution of income and wealth that fundamentally challenges the foundation of Japanese corporate capitalism in its neoliberal ethos; or the LDP-dominated political establishment with its neoconservative conceptions of citizenship and the common good.[37] Neither has there been a meaningful attempt to make the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, or pursue denuclearization with respect to global imbalances in economic and military power; nor has there been a clear expression of solidarity for indigenous peoples in their struggle for self-determination and resistance to American imperialism.[38] Unless these facets of reality can be debated and contested, there is little reason to expect more than incremental progress in the abolition of war.
同様の基準で、凝り固まった規範と行動に直面する社会的・政治的なビジョンの枠組みが、現在の平和活動に受け入れられるかどうかが今後の課題である。ネオリベラリズム精神、あるいは、自民党が主流である市民主義や公益のネオコンサバティズムな概念における日本の会社資本主義の基礎に対して根本的に挑戦する所得と富の再配分に対する要求はない。[37] さらに、原子力と核兵器とを関連して考える意味のある試みや、世界の経済的・軍事的な不均衡に関連して脱原子力を追求する動きも、原住民族の自己決定への取り組みやアメリカ帝国主義への抵抗に関する団結への明確な指示表明もない。[38] これらの現実の局面が論議され争点となる可能性がある限りは、戦争廃止に向けた漸進的な進捗以上のものを期待することは殆どできない。


Japan is undergoing a process of realignment amid escalating financial and ecological crises. There is a growing trend epitomized by concentrated political power, economy-first mentalities, reinforcement of military integration and consolidation of national identities. Constitutional revision, alongside ideological formulations of public policy, reflects a number of pernicious changes oriented away from providing for the civil liberties of citizens and toward imposing duties on people as national subjects. These developments are unfolding largely in relation to the renewed focus on Russia and China as part of America’s rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific and are paralleled by strategic counterweights to its trade agreements, military overtures and related hegemonic ambitions.[39]

The challenge faced by organizers in Japan is the need to initiate and sustain connections across disparate and factionalized movements that relate singular issues to broader systemic and structural problems of militarism, inequality and environmental degradation at home and abroad. Making democracy function in an atmosphere of dispossession, dogmatism and duplicity requires the participation of a capable and disciplined citizenry with the power to assert its shared interests. It demands a sense of civic agency and the practice of a radical politics that articulates vision, organizes community and builds power.[40] Such endeavors must begin with an understanding for the functions and relations of power that collectively shape interpersonal and institutional life.
日本のオーガナイザーが直面している課題は、一つの問題を、国内外の軍事、不均衡、環境劣化といったより広範なシステマチックで構造的な問題に関連付ける異質で異なる派閥の動きを創発し、持続させる必要があることである。非所有の雰囲気の中で、民主主義的な機能を発揮するためには、教条主義と二枚舌は、共有する利益を主張する権力を持った、能力を持ち規律ある市民の参加を必要とする。市民の主体性の感覚と、ビジョンとコミュニティを組織化し権力を構築する革命的な政策を必要とする。[40] そのような試みは、集合的に個人間および組織間の生活を形成する力の機能と関係についての理解から始めなければならない。

[1] “Nihon-Koku Kenpō,” National Diet Library, May 3, 2003.
[2] Michael Klare, “The Coming of Cold War 2.0,” TomDispatch, June 30, 2015.
[3] Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (London: Routledge, 2004).
[4] “LDP announces a new draft Constitution for Japan,” The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, May 7, 2012.
[7] Fumika Sato, “A Camouflaged Military: Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and Globalized Gender Mainstreaming,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, August 28, 2012.
[8] Lawrence Repeta, “Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, July 14, 2013.
[9] “Nihon koku kenpō kaisei sōan,” The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, April 27, 2012.
[10] “Basic Act on Education,” Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, December 22, 2006.
[11] David McNeill and Adam Lebowitz, “Hammering Down the Educational Nail: Abe Revises the Fundamental Law of Education,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, July 3, 2007.
[12] Norihiro Kato, “Tea Party Politics in Japan: Japan’s Rising Nationalism,” The New York Times, September 12, 2014.
[13] “Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo ni kansuru Hōritsu,” Cabinet Secretariat, December 13, 2013.
[14] Mina Pollmann, “Japan’s Troubling State Secrets Law Takes Effect,” The Diplomat, December 18, 2014.
[15] Lawrence Repeta, “A New State Secrecy Law for Japan?”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, October 21, 2013.
[16] “Paul Krugman: Meeting with Japanese officials,” The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, March 22, 2016.
[17] “Heiwa Anzen Hōsei,” Cabinet Secretariat, September 30, 2015.
[19] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012.
[20] Reiji Yoshida, “Japan defense chief says SDF could deal with nukes under security bills,” The Japan Times, August 5, 2015.
[21] “Abe Cabinet says Article 9 does not ban possessing, using N-weapons,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 2016.
[22] Gavan McCormack, “Japan as a Nuclear State,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, August 1, 2007.
[23] “National Defense Program Guidelines,” Ministry of Defense, December 17, 2013.
[24] “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Ministry of Defense, April 27, 2015.
[25] P. K. Sundaram, The Emerging Japan-India Relationship: Nuclear Anachronism, Militarism and Growth Fetish, The Asia-Pacific Journal, June 2, 2013.
[26] Matsumoto Tsuyoshi, “Revealing “Secret U.S.-Japan Nuclear Understandings”: A solemn obligation of Japan’s new government,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, December 14, 2009.
[27] Shaun Bernie and Frank Barnaby, “Nuclear Proliferation in Plain Sight: Japan’s Plutonium Fuel Cycle–A Technical and Economic Failure But a Strategic Success,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, March 1, 2016.
[28] Hiromichi Umebayashi, A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone with a Three-plus-Three Arrangement, The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, March 13, 2012.
[30] Morton H. Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, December 21, 2000.
[31] Chester Dawson, “In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear,” The Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2011.
[32] Jeff Kingston, “Japan’s Nuclear Village,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, September 9, 2012.
[33] Jonathan M. Smucker, “Can Prefigurative Politics Replace Political Strategy?”, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, October 7, 2014.
[34] David Slater, Nishimura Keiko and Love Kindstrand, “Social Media, Information and Political Activism in Japan’s 3.11 Crisis,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, June 7, 2012.
[35] Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, October 4, 2010.
[36] Mike Miller, “Alinsky for the Left: The Politics of Community Organizing,” Dissent Magazine, Winter 2010.
[37] Robin O’day, “Differentiating SEALDs from Freeters, and Precariats: the politics of youth movements in contemporary Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, September 14, 2015.
[39] Jon Letman, “The U.S. Is Militarizing the Pacific — and Not Taking Questions,” Foreign Policy In Focus, March 30, 2016.
[40] C. Douglas Lummis, Radical Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).